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MAY FEDERAL PROSECUTORS TAKE 
DIRECTION FROM THE PRESIDENT? 
Bruce A. Green* & Rebecca Roiphe** 
 
Suppose the president sought to serve as prosecutor-in-chief, telling 
prosecutors when to initiate or dismiss criminal charges in individual cases 
and making other discretionary decisions that are normally reserved to 
trained professionals familiar with the facts, law, and traditions of the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  To what extent may prosecutors follow the 
president’s direction?  In recent presidential administrations, the president 
has respected prosecutorial independence; while making policy decisions, 
the president deferred to the Attorney General and subordinate federal 
prosecutors to conduct individual criminal cases.  In a recent article, we 
argued that this is as it should be because the president has no constitutional 
or statutory authority to control federal criminal prosecutions.  But suppose 
one comes to the contrary conclusion—that the president, as chief executive, 
has authority to decide how individual criminal prosecutions should be 
conducted.  In this Article, we explore the consequences for prosecutors who 
receive the president’s orders. 
We argue here that federal prosecutors cannot invariably and 
unquestioningly follow the president’s direction because doing so would 
violate ethical rules and professional norms.  Further, because prosecutors’ 
professional obligations are created by courts and endorsed by federal 
statute, presidential control over prosecutorial decision-making would lead 
to serious separation-of-powers concerns.  Particularly, the integrity of the 
judicial system depends on the ethical rules at issue.  By exploring these 
separation-of-powers concerns, this Article contributes to a growing debate 
about the power of the executive over prosecution and further supports the 
independence of the DOJ and federal prosecutors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
President Trump’s lawyers have insisted that the U.S. Constitution gives 
the president “exclusive authority over the ultimate conduct and disposition 
of all criminal investigations and over those executive branch officials 
responsible for conducting those investigations.”1  The president and his 
team are not alone in claiming this authority for the executive.2  For example, 
in Morrison v. Olson,3 which upheld the federal independent counsel law that 
was later allowed to sunset, the late Justice Antonin Scalia argued in dissent 
that the Constitution vests executive power in the president and that 
“[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially 
executive function.”4  Many prominent constitutional scholars agree with 
Justice Scalia that the independent counsel law violated constitutional 
 
 1. Letter from Marc E. Kasowitz, Counsel to the President, to Robert S. Mueller, Special 
Counsel (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/02/us/politics/trump-
legal-documents.html [https://perma.cc/HF37-C3Y7].  The letter may have been 
distinguishing between authority over criminal investigations and criminal prosecutions, but 
that was not apparent from the context and it is not evident that different considerations would 
apply in these contexts.  Given the letter’s reference to the “ultimate conduct and disposition” 
of investigations, we read the letter as a claim of authority over federal criminal prosecutors 
and prosecutions no less than over federal criminal investigators and investigations. 
 2. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of 
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16 n.68, 17 nn.69 & 72 (2018) (citing authority).  The Article has 
been referenced and the argument summarized multiple times in the press. See, e.g., Charlie 
Savage, By Demanding an Investigation, Trump Challenged a Constraint on His Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/us/politics/trump-justice-
department-independence.html [https://perma.cc/H5TE-P8EX]; Adam Serwer, The Bill to 
Protect Mueller May Not Survive the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/is-the-senate-bill-to-protect-mueller-
constitutional/558440/ [https://perma.cc/PDT2-L47Z]; Trumpcast:  Trump’s Challenge to 
Prosecutorial Independence, SLATE (May 23, 2018, 11:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/podcasts/trumpcast/2018/05/trump_is_stress_testing_the_department_of_justice.htm
l [https://perma.cc/VNR5-JG7N] (interview with Rebecca Roiphe). 
 3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 4. Id. at 705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1)). 
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separation-of-powers principles,5 and although they do not necessarily 
proceed from the premise that the president has plenary constitutional 
authority over individual federal criminal prosecutions, some probably do.6  
Others disagree.7  This Article contributes to the debate by illustrating how 
presidential control over federal law enforcement would result in significant 
separation-of-powers concerns. 
Justice Scalia thought overseeing criminal cases was an essential executive 
function because both investigation and prosecution call for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, which necessitates “balancing . . . various legal, 
practical, and [nonpartisan] political considerations.”8  He described two 
criminal cases that, in his view, illustrated why the Constitution allows the 
president sole power to exercise prosecutorial discretion.  Both implicated 
foreign policy—the first involved subpoenaing a former public official of a 
neighboring country, and the other involved a prosecution that would 
necessitate disclosing “national security information.”9 
In a recent article, we acknowledged that criminal cases implicating 
foreign policy considerations offer the most compelling support for 
presidential authority over federal criminal prosecutions.10  Nonetheless, 
drawing on a century of U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding statutory 
limits on presidential power in the administrative state, we argued that 
Congress has the authority to decide who has ultimate prosecutorial 
authority.11  We explored the history of prosecutorial independence in 
 
 5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/09-26-17%20Amar%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/39ZG-R9MJ] (asserting 
that “[t]he lion’s share of the constitutional law scholars who are most expert and most 
surefooted on this particular topic now believe that Morrison was wrongly decided and/or that 
the case is no longer ‘good law’ that can be relied upon as a sturdy guidepost to what the 
current Court would and should do”). 
 6. Scholars have argued for a “unitary executive,” an executive power concentrated 
completely in the hands of the president. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER 
S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).  Some 
have argued specifically that the president has complete control over federal prosecution. 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 571 (2005). 
 7. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our 
Constitutional Scheme:  In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 563; 
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 476 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law 
Enforcement:  Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989); Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–
16 (1994); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism:  The Case 
of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18–26 (2018). 
 8. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 15, 28, 75. 
 11. Id. at 32–34.  We argue, in summary, that prosecuting crime is not an enumerated 
executive power; Congress has authority to decide who, within the executive branch, carries 
out many executive powers that are not specifically entrusted to the president; and the Court 
has already determined in Morrison (over Justice Scalia’s dissent) that prosecution is one such 
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America and argued that it is deeply woven into the fabric of our democracy.  
Given this history, we concluded that, absent any explicit statement 
otherwise, Congress has acquiesced in a system in which prosecutors can and 
should enjoy significant independence from the White House.12 
In this Article, we consider some of the implications of the alternate 
interpretation.  Suppose Justice Scalia was correct in his dissent that the 
president, as chief executive, generally may direct individual criminal 
prosecutions.  To what extent may federal prosecutors ethically comply?  
And if prosecutors comply with presidential direction in contravention of 
ethical and professional norms, would doing so undermine judicial 
independence? 
Neither Justice Scalia nor other proponents of plenary presidential 
authority over criminal justice have fully imagined how presidential 
authority over criminal prosecutions would be exercised and what would 
follow.  This Article argues that if a president directed federal prosecutors in 
their exercise of discretion, the prosecutors would confront serious ethical 
questions.  As lawyers, prosecutors are subject to professional conduct 
rules—both rules adopted by the federal courts before which they appear and, 
pursuant to a federal statute known as the McDade Amendment,13 rules 
adopted by the state judiciary in which they practice.14  Federal prosecutors 
would risk being whipsawed between their obligations to follow presidential 
direction and their obligation to comply with these rules. 
If federal prosecutors choose to ignore their professional obligations in 
favor of their duties to abide by presidential directive, there would be 
significant separation-of-powers concerns since prosecutors’ professional 
obligations derive from judge-made law and legislation.  If, on the other 
hand, all federal prosecutors abide by their ethical obligations and resign 
rather than risk ethically questionable conduct, the president would be 
hobbled in his constitutional obligation to “take Care” that the laws are 
faithfully executed.15 
Justice Scalia considered it anomalous for the president to lack authority 
to make prosecutorial decisions that implicate foreign policy, but we argue 
 
power that Congress may delegate to other executive officials. Id. at 7–37.  We further argue 
that the relevant statutes should be interpreted in light of the tradition of prosecutorial 
independence, which weighs against reading federal law to establish plenary presidential 
authority. Id. at 37–75. 
 12. Id. at 74–75. 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012) (“An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State 
laws and rules . . . governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that 
attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.”).  
For a discussion of federal court regulation of prosecutors’ ethics, see Bruce A. Green & Fred 
C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 399–413 
(2002). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837–40 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that federal prosecutors are subject to the ethics rule restricting communications with 
represented parties); see also United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a federal prosecutor was subject to discipline in New Mexico, where he was 
admitted to practice law). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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that it would be equally anomalous for federal prosecutors to obey 
presidential directions.  Part I lays the groundwork for our analysis by 
identifying two types of discretionary decisions that prosecutors ordinarily 
make in criminal cases:  first, decisions in their role as public officials of the 
type that clients ordinarily make, and second, strategic or tactical decisions 
that lawyers ordinarily make in litigation on behalf of clients.  Part II 
considers the federal prosecutor’s professional obligations if the president 
asserts authority to make the first type of discretionary decisions, which 
prosecutors ordinarily make as public officials on behalf of the government.  
Part III considers the prosecutor’s professional obligations if the president 
asserts authority, as the prosecutor’s supervisor, to make decisions of the 
second type, which prosecutors ordinarily make as lawyers.  As both 
discussions demonstrate, professional rules and norms would, at least in 
some circumstances, mandate that prosecutors decline to comply with the 
president’s direction.  We argue that, in the criminal context, both sets of 
rules are necessary to ensure disinterested decision-making and a properly 
functioning criminal justice system. 
For the president to have exclusive authority over federal prosecutors, the 
president’s executive power under Article II must supersede both federal 
judicial authority to enforce professional conduct rules and congressional 
authority to pass a law (signed by an earlier president) requiring federal 
prosecutors to comport with state rules of professional conduct.  Part IV 
addresses the separation-of-powers problems raised by the claim that 
presidential authority over federal prosecutors displaces the ordinary 
restraints imposed by professional conduct rules.  The broader point is that 
an independent judiciary depends on independent prosecutors to bring 
appropriate cases, decline to bring inappropriate ones, and ensure a level of 
truth and fairness in the judicial process.  Prosecutors beholden to the 
president would be impeded in carrying out this function and the judiciary 
itself would be hobbled.  These constitutional problems, on their face, are no 
less vexing than those that troubled Justice Scalia.16 
Finally, the Article concludes by considering whether our analysis will 
matter practically for the U.S. Attorney General or other prosecutors who 
receive presidential directions to act contrary to U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) policy, professional norms, and their own best judgment.  It 
acknowledges that federal prosecutors face no realistic disciplinary risk for 
acceding to presidential direction since state disciplinary authorities rarely 
sanction prosecutors.  Moreover, federal courts will often have no 
meaningful way of enforcing relevant professional conduct rules, especially 
if breaches are hard to detect.  But the possibility of engaging in professional 
misconduct and the associated reputational cost would be a plausible 
 
 16. David Reisman makes a related argument about the flaws in Justice Scalia’s Morrison 
dissent. See generally David N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia’s Separation of 
Powers Jurisprudence:  The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REV. 49 (1988).  He argues 
that, taken to its logical conclusion, Justice Scalia’s argument would necessarily result in the 
impermissible diminution of the power of the judiciary and Congress. Id. at 91–94. 
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rationale for defying presidential decrees and a legitimate basis for 
congressional inquiry of prosecutors who choose to acquiesce. 
Even if ethical norms are not enforced, the practical consequences of a 
president’s effort to direct federal prosecution might theoretically defeat 
rather than enhance executive power.  First, it hardly seems like it would 
fulfill the plain meaning of the “take Care” clause of the Constitution if the 
president leads a team of prosecutors who are or could be violating important 
ethical norms.17  The faithful execution of the law must be read to incorporate 
these norms and traditions.  Second, if federal prosecutors choose to abide by 
their ethical obligations rather than face congressional or other inquiry, they 
would have to resign or at least recuse themselves from the particular matter.  
At the very least, this would leave the executive branch without trained 
prosecutors to pursue pressing cases.  Taken to its logical extreme, it could 
leave the executive branch stripped of effective criminal law enforcement.  
This would ironically cripple the president’s ability to enforce the laws, 
whether through presidential directive or through more conventional means 
involving presidential appointments and oversight.  In other words, the 
unitary executive theory of plenary control over federal prosecution could, at 
least theoretically, diminish the president’s ability to enforce federal criminal 
laws effectively. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  CONCEPTUALIZING THE PRESIDENT-PROSECUTOR 
RELATIONSHIP IN ETHICAL TERMS 
In general, federal prosecutors in the DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
make prosecutorial decisions on behalf of the government in criminal 
cases.18  These include decisions about the conduct of grand jury 
proceedings, whether to initiate criminal charges against particular 
individuals and the nature of those charges, whether to offer a plea bargain 
or move to dismiss charges, whether to seek an order immunizing witnesses 
from the use of their testimony, what pretrial disclosures to make to the 
defense beyond the legally required minimum, trial decisions regarding what 
witnesses to call and evidence to offer, how to examine witnesses, what 
 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  For a discussion of the textual and original public meaning 
of the “take Care” Clause of the Constitution, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream 
On:  The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, 
and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 798–808 (2013). 
 18. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) (“A 
prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determination of which 
persons should be targets of investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what 
information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be charged with what offenses, 
which persons should be utilized as witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the 
terms on which they will be established, and whether any individuals should be granted 
immunity.”).  Many federal criminal investigative decisions, including whether to make a 
warrantless arrest or search, are made by federal investigative agents, not prosecutors, 
although prosecutors oversee grand jury investigations and ordinarily participate in 
applications for search and arrest warrants.  Additionally, lawyers outside the DOJ may be 
specially designated to serve as federal prosecutors in the DOJ or in a U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
See United States v. Dulski, 395 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 515(a)). 
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arguments to make, and so on—decisions both large and small.  Among the 
various lawyers with federal prosecutorial authority—the Attorney General, 
U.S. Attorneys, DOJ lawyers, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys—different 
decisions in any given prosecution may be made by different lawyers.  In a 
given case, some decisions are dictated by DOJ policy, having been adopted 
by the Attorney General for the conduct of all criminal cases.19  Within the 
confines of DOJ policy, high-ranking DOJ officials must approve 
particularly sensitive decisions, such as whether to seek the death penalty;20 
supervisory prosecutors generally sign off on indictments and plea 
agreements;21 and subordinate trial prosecutors (Assistant U.S. Attorneys or 
Assistant Attorneys General) typically make strategic trial decisions.22 
Prosecutorial decision-making differs from decision-making in most legal 
representations.  In an ordinary lawyer-client relationship, and particularly 
one involving an individual client, decision-making authority is divided 
between the client and the lawyer.  Primarily as a matter of agency law, the 
client, as principal, has control over the key decisions, such as whether to 
initiate or settle a civil lawsuit.23  Conversely, if only as a matter of practical 
necessity, lawyers make strategic decisions about how to carry out the 
client’s objectives, such as how to pose questions to witnesses and whether 
to make evidentiary objections at trial.24  To a large extent, clients defer to 
lawyers on questions calling for legal expertise, but sometimes controversies 
about who has the authority to decide an issue arise when lawyers and clients 
disagree.  In recent decades, drafters of professional conduct rules have made 
a largely unsatisfactory effort to identify how such disagreements should be 
 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing 
the policy in the DOJ manual regarding tax indictments); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial 
Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 252 (2017) (discussing the role of DOJ policy in 
federal prosecutors’ decision-making). 
 20. See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 168–69 (D. Conn. 1998) (discussing 
DOJ policy regarding the prosecution of capital cases); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death 
Penalty:  History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 347, 410 (1999) (discussing DOJ decision-making in capital cases). 
 21. See United States v. Kouri-Perez, 47 F. Supp. 2d 164, 165–66 (D.P.R. 1999) 
(interpreting the procedural rule requiring indictments to be signed by the Attorney General, 
U.S. Attorneys, or their authorized assistants). 
 22. Much of the decision-making authority exercised by subordinate federal prosecutors 
is delegated by a higher-ranking lawyer, who has ultimate authority to make any given 
decision in a federal criminal matter.  One might assume that because the Attorney General 
has supervisory authority, the Attorney General is authorized to dictate all decisions.  But U.S. 
Attorneys, who have statutory authority to conduct criminal litigation in their districts, might 
lay claim to decision-making authority as to cases in their districts.  And trial prosecutors may 
argue that there are certain decisions that, as counsel of record in individual cases, they must 
be free to make.  Whatever uncertainty may exist in theory is almost always resolved privately 
and consensually in practice. 
 23. Professional conduct rules codify this understanding. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as 
to the means by which they are to be pursued”). 
 24. Professional conduct rules require that lawyers consult with their clients about these 
strategic decisions where possible. See id. r. 1.2(a), 1.4. 
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resolved.25  One answer is that clients determine the “ends” or objectives of 
the representation while the lawyer chooses the “means” to carry them out.  
Although the ends-means distinction sometimes breaks down in practice,26 it 
is generally a useful distinction and reflects the conventional judicial 
understanding.27 
Unlike civil attorneys who have a concrete client, prosecutors represent 
the government or the public.  For prosecutors to make discretionary 
decisions in criminal cases, prosecutors must serve not only the conventional 
role of a lawyer for a client in litigation who makes decisions about “means,” 
but also the role of the client or the client’s designated agent who makes 
decisions about objectives.  In turn, if a president asserts control over the 
prosecution’s discretionary decisions, the president would serve two roles.  
First, the president would usurp the prosecutor’s traditional role as the 
government representative making decisions about objectives.  And, second, 
as the prosecutor’s supervisor or boss, the president would direct how the 
prosecutor as lawyer makes decisions about the means by which those 
objectives are carried out. 
As discussed below in Parts II and III, these conceptions of the president’s 
role implicate two sets of professional conduct rules—first, those governing 
lawyers’ ability to take direction from representatives of entity clients; and 
second, those governing lawyers’ ability to take direction from nonlawyer 
 
 25. The current version of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct advises lawyers to look to other law to resolve certain disputes over 
decision-making. See id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (“Because of the varied nature of the matters about 
which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate 
the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such 
disagreements are to be resolved.  Other law, however, may be applicable and should be 
consulted by the lawyer.”).  In the context of criminal defense representation, courts have 
resolved certain questions of decision-making authority in the course of interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 
1500, 1505 (2018) (holding that the capital defendant’s trial lawyer may not concede the 
defendant’s guilt over the defendant’s objection); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753–54 
(1983) (holding that a criminal defendant’s appellate lawyer may decide what issues to raise 
on appeal).  Much of the scholarship on the division of decision-making in the lawyer-client 
relationship is likewise addressed to criminal defense representations. See generally Rodney 
J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and 
Criminal Defendant:  An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1998); Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:  
Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000).  It is 
unclear whether these writings are entirely relevant outside the criminal defense context.  Even 
if so, they resolve only a fraction of the questions that might arise. 
 26. See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship:  The 
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 325 (1987) (“[T]he line between means and 
ends is imprecise at best.  At a minimum, clients have a legitimate, and at times, overriding 
interest in what many characterize as the ‘means’ of the lawsuit.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that “the 
allocation of control between attorney and client typically dictates that ‘the client decides the 
“ends” of the lawsuit while the attorney controls the “means”’” (quoting Strauss, supra note 
26, at 318)).  The Restatement appears to advocate for greater client authority.  It recognizes 
that lawyers must often make decisions without time to consult with the client but implies that 
lawyers must abide by clients’ instructions that do not require acting unlawfully. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 21–23 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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employers.  One set of rules forecloses a lawyer from acting on certain 
decisions made by an authorized representative of an entity client.28  When 
the representative is acting lawlessly or in breach of fiduciary duty, the 
entity’s lawyer may have to refuse the representative’s direction because the 
lawyer owes loyalty to the entity, not its representative.29  A second set of 
rules forecloses a lawyer from taking direction from a nonlawyer boss 
regarding the means by which to achieve the entity client’s objectives.30  
Both sets of rules cast doubt on whether, as a matter of professional ethics, 
prosecutors may invariably implement the president’s directive, and they 
suggest that prosecutors must exercise some degree of professional 
independence in light of the prosecutor’s conventional duty to “seek 
justice.”31 
And this insight, in turn, raises the constitutional separation-of-powers 
question of whether presidential authority supersedes court-adopted 
professional conduct rules, as plenary presidential authority over criminal 
prosecution seems to presuppose, or vice versa.  The separation-of-powers 
concern is particularly pressing because in the criminal context these ethics 
rules, at their core, protect disinterested prosecutorial decision-making.  The 
judiciary generally relies on trial lawyers, including prosecutors, to comply 
with professional expectations.32  In particular, the judiciary relies on 
prosecutors to exercise discretion in disinterested fashion against the 
background of professional traditions, norms, policies, and understandings.33  
While lawyers are imperfect, and judges have regulatory means of 
responding when prosecutors and other lawyers act improperly, courts rely 
on prosecutors generally to comply with professional norms so that courts 
can do their own job of promoting a fair process and fair outcome in criminal 
cases.34  Allowing a president to control prosecutors threatens to undermine 
the judiciary, not just by stripping it of the ability to impose ethics rules on 
lawyers, but also by impeding it in performing its core function of 
determining the facts and applying the law in individual criminal cases. 
We examine these previously unexplored professional and constitutional 
questions in the context of criminal cases where U.S. foreign policy is 
implicated.  In particular, we focus on the following scenario: 
A foreign government arrests a U.S. citizen for espionage.  The president 
directs the Attorney General to arrest and prosecute a prominent citizen of 
the foreign country when he is in the United States for business, so that the 
United States has a bargaining chip and publicly conveys its toughness.  
 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Parts II–III. 
 32. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980) (“[T]rial courts necessarily rely 
in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel.”); see also Bruce 
Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 
55–56 (2016) (describing courts’ traditional reliance on prosecutorial integrity). 
 33. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 32, at 55–56. 
 34. See infra Part III.B. 
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The Attorney General believes that the foreign citizen has not committed 
any crime but that the DOJ can pull together circumstantial evidence of a 
crime that will (barely) satisfy probable cause—the requisite amount of 
evidence for an arrest and prosecution.  The president directs the DOJ to 
maximize leverage by seeking the foreign citizen’s pretrial detention, 
prolonging proceedings through deleterious motion practice and requests 
for continuances, refusing any negotiated resolution, and maintaining the 
prosecution through trial and likely acquittal, until the U.S. citizen is 
released.35 
The process by which a president would resolve a question of prosecutorial 
discretion in a situation such as this is uncertain since no contemporary 
president has asserted control over individual federal prosecutions.  But we 
assume for purposes of this inquiry that the president would decide in the 
way that presidents ordinarily make decisions, not in the way prosecutors 
ordinarily make decisions.  That is, we assume the president would not 
consider himself bound by DOJ policy and would not attempt to replicate a 
prosecutor’s decision-making process under DOJ policy and practice.  
Rather, the president would set priorities as an elected government official 
who is not committed to the values, policies, and practices of federal 
prosecutors.  The president would likely seek advice on the relevant foreign 
policy considerations from officials in the U.S. Department of State or 
elsewhere outside the DOJ.  We assume that the president would not only 
consider nonpartisan political considerations but would also consider 
partisan political considerations such as how a failure to free a foreign citizen 
arrested abroad will play in the polls or future elections.  While prosecutors 
do and should consider many factors in making discretionary decisions, 
partisan concerns such as these are considered impermissible motivating 
factors in prosecutorial decision-making.36 
 
 35. This is a modified and expanded version of a scenario that was presented but not 
analyzed in our earlier article. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 8.  We acknowledge that this 
scenario, which implicates the criminal defendant’s due process rights as well as prosecutorial 
independence, differs from the converse, where the president directs a prosecutor to dismiss 
criminal charges to promote foreign policy objectives.  In the former but not the latter scenario, 
the defendant whose prosecution is dismissed is prejudiced by the president’s intervention.  
On the other hand, in some situations where the president acts to end a particular prosecution, 
similarly situated defendants whose prosecutions are continued may argue that they are treated 
unfairly or discriminatorily, in contravention of the general principle that prosecutors should 
treat similarly situated defendants in like fashion. 
 36. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 
3-1.7(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s 
professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political, 
financial, professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships.”); see also id. 
Standard 3-4.4 (discussing the factors relevant to prosecutors’ discretion in filing, declining, 
and maintaining criminal charges).  See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, 
Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 476–77 (2017) (discussing 
the illegitimacy of prosecutorial decision-making based on partisan politics).  Professional 
standards on prosecutorial decision-making presuppose that prosecutorial authority will be 
exercised by a lawyer. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION Standard 3-2.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The prosecution function should be 
performed by a lawyer who is (i) a public official, (ii) authorized to practice law in the 
jurisdiction, and (iii) subject to rules of attorney professional conduct and discipline.”). 
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A scenario where criminal charges might be brought to promote a foreign 
policy objective unrelated to the potential defendant’s guilt or innocence is a 
legitimate and useful context in which to explore the relevant professional 
and constitutional questions.  On one hand, leaving aside restrictions on 
prosecutors’ decision-making processes, it would presumably be 
constitutional to prosecute the foreign national because there is probable 
cause.  This is important because a president’s exercise of executive authority 
is bound by the law; while the president must “take Care” to ensure that the 
law is faithfully exercised, the implication is that the president may not 
himself violate the law.37  On the other hand, prosecuting an individual who 
is believed to be innocent, although “probable cause” exists, would almost 
certainly be so far contrary to conventional prosecutorial policy and practice 
that, even giving appropriate weight to the administration’s legitimate 
foreign policy interests and preferences, Attorneys General acting on their 
own authority would ordinarily decline to initiate criminal prosecution.  That 
is because the understanding among federal prosecutors is that individuals 
should not be prosecuted unless prosecuting authorities believe them to be 
guilty and believe a trial to be winnable.38  Since one can envision the 
president exercising prosecutorial discretion differently from the Attorney 
General, it matters which has ultimate legal authority to make the 
discretionary decision. 
II.  THE PRESIDENT AS THE CLIENT’S DECISION MAKER 
There is sometimes uncertainty about how to characterize or identify a 
government lawyer’s “client,”39 but in a federal criminal case it is plain that, 
however one reads the Constitution and federal statutes, the president is not 
the federal prosecutor’s client.40  The prosecutor’s client is the United States, 
 
 37. It has long been understood that the president is not above the law. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high that he is above 
the law.  No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.  All the officers of 
the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey 
it.”).  After leaving office, President Nixon famously suggested the contrary:  “when the 
President does it, that means that it is not illegal.” Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of Law and 
the Rise of Control of Executive Power, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 303, 342–44 (2014) (quoting 
Nixon’s interview with David Frost).  But the Court had not been sympathetic to the idea that 
President Nixon was above the law. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714–16 (1974) 
(holding that executive privilege did not immunize the president from a grand jury subpoena 
for tape recordings and documents). 
 38. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-4.3 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 39. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“No universal definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible.”). 
 40. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987) 
(stating that prosecutors are “appointed solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of 
the court’s authority”); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 n.5 (1987) (“[T]he 
constituency of an elected prosecutor is the public.”); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The prosecutor generally 
serves the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, 
witness or victim.  When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor does 
not represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter and such law 
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not the president either individually or officially.41  At the state and local 
level, different prosecutors bring criminal cases in the name of different 
public entities, such as the State, the Commonwealth, and the People, but 
their clients are always abstractions—a sovereignty or the public at large—
not flesh-and-blood people such as an alleged victim and not the prosecutors 
themselves or their investigators.  In 1935, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Berger v. United States42 that essentially the same goes for federal 
prosecutors: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to 
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense 
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer.43 
In other words, the federal prosecutor’s client is the United States and, in 
making decisions on its behalf, the federal prosecutor’s obligation is to see 
“that justice shall be done.”44 
To say that the client is a sovereignty, a public entity, or a similar 
abstraction is not necessarily to say who makes decisions on the 
sovereignty’s behalf.  It is conventionally understood, however, that 
prosecutors make the decisions that clients, as well as lawyers, ordinarily 
make in a civil case.45  At the federal level, this would not necessarily mean 
 
enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor’s clients.”).  In various other contexts, the 
president may be a lawyer’s client.  For example, the current president has retained various 
lawyers to represent him personally in response to Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation of 
Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. See Caroline Kelly & Liz Stark, Key 
Events in the Talks Between the Trump and Mueller Teams, CNN (June 5, 2018, 
7:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/05/politics/trump-mueller-timeline/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/QT6F-ZPYM] (noting that at various times the team of lawyers representing 
President Trump in connection with the Russia investigation has included Ty Cobb, John 
Dowd, Emmet Flood, Rudolph Giuliani, Marc Kasowitz, Jane and Marty Raskin, and Jay 
Sekulow).  In other contexts, a lawyer, including the Attorney General or another DOJ lawyer, 
may represent the president or other government official in his or her official capacity. See, 
e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402–03 (2018). 
 41. For a discussion of the difference between public officials’ involvement in litigation 
in their personal versus official capacity and the significance of this difference, see Cheney v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 918–20 (2004) (Scalia, J., memorandum respecting recusal). 
 42. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 43. Id. at 88. 
 44. Id.  Courts frequently refer to prosecutors’ duty to seek justice. See, e.g., Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65–66 (2011); Bertolotti v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).  
Scholars have written about the implications of this obligation. See generally Bruce A. Green, 
Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); K. Babe 
Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal 
Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285 (2014); Robert H. Jackson, The Federal 
Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as 
Minister of Justice:  Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. 
L. REV. 37 (2009). 
 45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.3 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The public’s interests and views . . . should be determined by the chief 
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that foreign policy considerations, or presidential preferences about foreign 
policy, drop out of discretionary decision-making, as Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Morrison implied.46  It would simply mean that, after taking account of 
the president’s preferences, the Attorney General or another federal 
prosecutor would make the discretionary decision, such as whether to 
prosecute an individual.47  In the scenario described above, the result would 
likely be a decision not to prosecute the foreign national because the 
prosecutorial norm against prosecuting possibly innocent individuals is so 
compelling.48  But in other situations, after taking into consideration 
professional norms as well as executive policy concerns, prosecutors might 
defer to the president’s priorities or reach the same conclusion as the 
president.  As in other legal representations, any initial disagreements would 
probably be resolved privately and consensually in most cases. 
Saying that the president has “exclusive authority” in criminal 
prosecutions presupposes that federal criminal prosecution is different from 
state criminal prosecution, in that the federal government’s chief executive, 
not a prosecutor, is the official with ultimate power to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion.  One might analogize the federal government, a public entity, to a 
private entity, such as a corporation, which operates through officers and 
 
prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.”); Green, supra note 44, at 633 
(explaining that federal prosecutors make decisions “ordinarily entrusted to a client”).  At the 
state and local level, for example, although state governors or other executive branch officials 
may have authority to remove prosecutors who appear to be acting unlawfully or who appear 
to have a conflict of interest, the chief executive officers ordinarily do not have constitutional 
or statutory authority to make prosecutorial decisions in individual cases—that is, to direct the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. 2017) 
(holding that the governor did not exceed his constitutional and statutory authority by 
reassigning the prosecution of a capital case, and observing:  “[I]mportant to our holding is 
that the Governor did not attempt to decide which cases are deserving of the death penalty.  
The Governor’s orders do not direct [State Attorney] King to seek the death penalty in any of 
the reassigned cases, and King has sworn that the Governor has not attempted to interfere with 
his determination as to whether to pursue the death penalty in any case.”); Johnson v. Pataki, 
691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007–08 (N.Y. 2017) (upholding Governor Pataki’s replacement of the 
district attorney in a criminal case but noting that he did not direct the exercise of discretion 
in the case).  But see State ex rel. Stubbs v. Dawson, 119 P. 360, 364–65 (Kan. 1911) 
(upholding the governor’s power to direct the state attorney general to initiate a prosecution); 
Garrett v. State ex rel. Atty. Gen., 238 P. 846, 847 (Okla. 1925) (describing a statute 
authorizing the governor to initiate prosecutions).  The allocation of decision-making authority 
when a state is a party in civil, rather than criminal, litigation is more ambiguous.  It has been 
suggested, however, that state attorneys general ordinarily have more independence from 
governors than the U.S. Attorney General has been assumed to have from the president. See 
generally William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?  Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2478–79 (2006). 
 46. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726–29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion:  Ramsey Clark 
and the Selective Non-Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) 
(describing a discussion within President Lyndon Johnson’s cabinet regarding whether to 
prosecute black leaders for inciting urban riots, after which Attorney General Ramsay Clark 
made the decision not to prosecute, contrary to the preference of other cabinet members). 
 48. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-4.3 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015). 
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employees and is headed by a board of directors.49  Although the client is the 
entity, which is a legal abstraction, the decisions that are conventionally made 
by a client must be made by one or more individuals as the entity’s 
representatives—that is, in the language of the professional conduct rules, by 
the entity’s “duly authorized constituents.”50  In the corporate context, the 
corporate bylaws determine who stands in the client’s shoes.51  Typically, 
the ultimate decision maker is the board.52  The corporate board may opt to 
delegate its authority to the corporation’s chief executive officer, to another 
corporate officer, or to the corporation’s in-house or outside counsel.53  But 
even if it does so, as the ultimate decision maker, the board can reassume that 
power in a particular case.  In a federal criminal case, one might argue, the 
president, with Congress’s consent, ordinarily delegates authority to DOJ 
lawyers, just as the board ordinarily delegates to subordinate officers or 
lawyers.54  But when it matters, the president can reassert authority just as 
the corporate board may.  In other words, on this account, the president is the 
federal government’s ultimate “duly authorized constituent” for purposes of 
decision-making. 
If one accepts this account of how authority is constitutionally allocated in 
federal criminal cases, professional conduct rules dictate restraints on 
prosecutors as lawyers for the United States.  In general, lawyers for an 
entity, including a public entity, owe duties of competence and loyalty to the 
entity, not to the officers or other representatives who direct the 
representation on the entity’s behalf.55  That means that the entity’s lawyers 
cannot simply accept imprudent direction from the entity’s authorized 
representatives as lawyers might from a flesh-and-blood client.56  Entity 
lawyers have a responsibility, at minimum, to intercede when the entity’s 
 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (recognizing that, subject to exceptions, the principles governing the representation of 
a private entity apply to a government lawyer). 
 50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2019). 
 52. See, e.g., DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 4 (2013). 
 53. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
 54. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The Attorney General and 
United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.  They 
have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help 
him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’” (first quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); then quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“A lawyer representing only an organization does not owe duties of care, 
diligence, or confidentiality to constituents of the organization.” (citations omitted)); id. § 97 
cmt. f (“Courts have stressed that a lawyer representing a governmental client must seek to 
advance the public interest in the representation and not merely the partisan or personal 
interests of the government entity or officer involved.”). 
 56. As in representing any client, a lawyer for an entity has a counseling function.  The 
lawyer must provide the entity’s authorized representative adequate advice to enable the 
representative to make informed decisions. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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representative is acting unlawfully or in breach of fiduciary duty while 
making legal decisions on behalf of the entity.57 
How does this translate to the federal criminal context?  Certain decisions 
in a criminal prosecution involve objectives or ends, not means—for 
example, the decisions whether to prosecute, plea bargain, or dismiss a 
prosecution.  If the president acts on behalf of the United States in making 
decisions such as these, the Attorney General or subordinate prosecutor 
cannot unquestioningly follow the president’s direction. 
If the president directs the prosecutor to take an illegal action, it would 
clearly be unethical (and perhaps illegal) for a prosecutor to comply.  For 
example, prosecuting in the absence of probable cause would violate 
constitutional due process.58  If a prosecutor knows that probable cause does 
not exist, based on her own examination of the evidence, she could not 
ethically comply with a presidential direction to prosecute.59 
Similarly, it may violate due process or the equal protection clause to 
prosecute someone in retaliation for their exercise of a constitutional right60 
or based on a racial or religious motivation.61  Where constitutionally 
impermissible considerations appear to be at play, a prosecutor would have 
some obligation to investigate the president’s deliberative process to satisfy 
 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (“A lawyer representing an organization is required to act with reasonable competence 
and diligence in the representation and to use care in representing the organizational client.  
The lawyer thus must not knowingly or negligently assist any constituent to breach a legal 
duty to the organization.  However, a lawyer’s duty of care to the organization is not limited 
to avoidance of assisting acts that threaten injury to a client.  A lawyer is also required to act 
diligently and to exercise care by taking steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a 
client.” (citations omitted)).  Thus, if the representative acts unlawfully on the entity’s behalf 
in a manner that might inure to the entity’s likely detriment, a lawyer may not simply follow 
the representative’s direction.  Likewise, a lawyer may not simply accept direction from an 
entity representative who is breaching his fiduciary duty by, for example, advancing his own 
self-interest at the expense of the entity.  In such situations, the lawyer’s loyalty is owed to the 
entity-client, not to its individual representative, and the lawyer must act in the entity’s best 
interest.  This may mean referring the matter to higher authority, refusing to act as directed, 
or, if necessary to protect the entity from substantial injury, making a public disclosure. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3(b)–(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 58. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long 
as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined 
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
 59. Indeed, the professional conduct rules explicitly so provide. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . 
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (stating that a prosecutor may 
not bring a more serious charge in retaliation for a defendant’s successful exercise of his right 
to appeal). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“[T]he decision 
whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification.’” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))); cf. 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8, 319 (1987) (recognizing that purposeful racial 
discrimination in the implementation of the death sentence violates equal protection but cannot 
be proven based on statistical evidence). 
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herself that the government is lawfully pursuing charges.  For example, a 
prosecutor could not comply with a presidential dictate to pursue criminal 
charges if the prosecutor concluded that the president’s decision was in 
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right or was animated by racial 
or religious bias. 
What if the president acts, not contrary to constitutional law, but contrary 
to well-established prosecutorial norms in ordering an undeserved 
prosecution or halting a legitimate one?  In that event, he has at least arguably 
failed to fulfill his constitutional obligation to “take Care” that the laws are 
faithfully executed.62  Even if the prosecutor were generally required to 
accept the president’s decisions on behalf of the government, it would be 
problematic to follow the direction of a president who has neglected his 
constitutional mandate in this manner.  Traditionally, the president’s role in 
executing criminal law has been limited to setting criminal justice policy and 
hiring and firing the Attorney General and other high-ranking prosecutors, 
and so there is no settled understanding of what it means for the president to 
faithfully execute the criminal law in making decisions in individual criminal 
cases.  It seems unlikely that presidential decisions that are not flatly illegal 
automatically qualify as faithful executions of the criminal law.  If the 
president is not required to adhere to conventional prosecutorial 
understandings, then presidential decision-making must be measured against 
some other set of understandings.  As a lawyer for the United States, a federal 
prosecutor cannot implement presidential decisions unquestioningly; rather, 
professional norms would require the prosecutor to consider whether the 
president is executing the law faithfully and, thus, consistently with the 
president’s fiduciary duty to the United States. 
A further question is whether the president is making prosecutorial 
decisions in a disinterested manner or is breaching his fiduciary duty by 
seeking to further his own interest or the interests of others.  This analysis 
requires an understanding of what it means for any elected public officials, 
but particularly the president, to serve as a fiduciary, both in general and in 
criminal cases particularly.  There is a firmly rooted professional expectation, 
if not constitutional requirement, that prosecutors engage in disinterested 
decision-making.63  There are also judicial and professional understandings 
of what it means for prosecutors, as public officials, to properly use or abuse 
 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 17, at 798–808. 
 63. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987) (“It 
is a fundamental premise of our society that the state wield its formidable criminal 
enforcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion, for liberty itself may be at stake in 
such matters.  We have always been sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the 
criminal justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to compromise the 
performance of their duty.”); Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It 
is a bit easier to say what a disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is.  He is not 
disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of others who have, an axe to grind against 
the defendant, as distinguished from the appropriate interest that members of society have in 
bringing a defendant to justice with respect to the crime with which he is charged.”).  See 
generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 36. 
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their authority in a criminal case.64  This tradition is based on the assumption 
that it is in the public interest—the interest of the client—to pursue 
prosecutions in a disinterested way.  In the absence of a tradition of 
presidential control over criminal prosecutions, there is no comparable 
understanding of how presidents should and should not make prosecutorial 
decisions.  But if it is in the public interest for prosecutions to be conducted 
in a disinterested way, then presumably this interest persists regardless of 
who is responsible for making decisions. 
Notwithstanding some uncertainty, we assume that presidents, like public 
prosecutors, have an obligation to the sovereignty to “seek justice,” as that 
concept has been elaborated by federal courts over the years.  Although the 
concept has been incorporated into lawyers’ professional ethics codes,65 
there is no reason to assume that the obligation to seek justice identified in 
Berger would be any less applicable to other public officials who took the 
prosecutorial reins.  Indeed, the early nineteenth-century judicial 
understanding was that even when private lawyers were retained by private 
clients to initiate criminal prosecutions, as occurred with some frequency at 
the time, the lawyers were obligated to conform to public prosecutors’ 
professional expectations.66  The reasoning offered in Berger would apply 
equally to any other public official:  the sovereignty’s interest in a criminal 
case is in governing impartially and achieving justice, and therefore its 
representative, whether or not a lawyer, must pursue those objectives when 
exercising decision-making authority on the sovereignty’s behalf, as a matter 
of fiduciary duty if not professional obligation. 
This does not mean that a president would be expected to exercise 
discretion in precisely the same way as the particular prosecutor who is asked 
to implement the president’s direction.  After all, different prosecutors can 
come out differently on questions of discretion, and often do.  But while there 
is ample room for different judgments about how best to achieve justice, the 
pursuit of justice excludes certain criteria for decision-making, such as the 
decision maker’s personal interest, the interest of a third party, or partisan 
 
 64. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, 3d 
ed. 2009); R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (2005). 
 65. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 66. See Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189–90 (1845), discussed in Fred C. Zacharias & 
Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005); cf. 
Young, 481 U.S. at 804 (“Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action 
represent the United States, not the party that is the beneficiary of the court order allegedly 
violated. . . .  The prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of 
the court’s authority.  A private attorney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore 
certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a 
prosecution.”).  This is not to say that there was a consensus among prosecutors and the public 
around prosecutors’ duty to seek justice. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of 
“Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1316–17 (2002) 
(arguing that in the nineteenth century, prosecutors and members of the public did not widely 
share today’s understandings regarding prosecutors’ duties). 
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political advantage.67   Additionally, certain principles, although not 
necessarily codified in the law, are conventionally understood to apply to 
decision-making in criminal cases, such as, most obviously, that prosecutors 
should endeavor to avoid punishing innocent people.68  A prosecutor cannot 
simply ignore evidence that the president is breaching his fiduciary duty in 
giving a particular direction. 
All of this suggests that, given the rules and norms of lawyers’ professional 
conduct, there are limits on prosecutors’ ability to accept the president’s 
direction, assuming the president has constitutional authority to make 
decisions about the government’s objectives in a criminal case.  In the 
hypothetical foreign policy scenario, for example, a prosecutor might 
conclude that the president was breaching his fiduciary duty to seek justice 
in ordering the prosecution of a probably innocent foreign national to gain 
leverage in a foreign policy dispute.  To be sure, nonpartisan political 
considerations, including foreign policy considerations, may deserve 
considerable weight in other criminal contexts.  For example, it would be 
legitimate and not uncommon to release a foreign national prosecuted for 
espionage as part of a “spy swap.”69  But most would regard it as an abuse of 
government power to prosecute someone who is likely innocent, and even 
more problematic to prosecute a probably innocent person for instrumental 
reasons unrelated to the individual’s culpability and the ends of criminal 
justice.  If one accepts that the professional norms of the prosecutor are not 
merely a nicety but rather a necessity for the proper functioning of the 
criminal justice system, it follows that the president would fail to fulfill his 
constitutional obligation to “take Care” that the law is faithfully executed if 
he usurps the decision-making authority normally left to professional 
prosecutors by directing them to prosecute the foreign national despite their 
informed belief that he was innocent.  Further, if it appeared that the 
 
 67. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 3-1.7(f) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s professional 
judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political, financial, 
professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships.”).  See generally Green & 
Roiphe, supra note 36. 
 68. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 
3-4.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A prosecutor’s office should not file or maintain charges if 
it believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.”).  Difficult 
questions, which are beyond the scope of this Article, may be posed about the extent of 
prosecutors’ “gatekeeping” responsibility to prevent the conviction of innocent people.  
Prosecutors disagree among themselves about whether it is proper to seek to secure a 
conviction of someone where the prosecutor’s office has a “reasonable doubt” about his guilt 
and, if so, at what point uncertainty about someone’s guilt should preclude a prosecution.  
Likewise, prosecutors disagree about whether it is proper to bring a case to trial when the 
office believes it may not win and how likely an acquittal must be to require the office to forgo 
or terminate a prosecution. See generally Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 497–501 
(2009) (surveying disparate approaches that prosecutors may take toward their responsibility 
to avoid charging innocent defendants). 
 69. The “spy swap” of Rudolf Abel and Francis Powers depicted in the movie Bridge of 
Spies is a well-known example. See generally BRIDGE OF SPIES (Dreamworks 2015). 
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president’s underlying motivation was to promote personal self-interest or 
partisan political interests, the decision would be all the more dubious. 
Of course, if one starts with the premise that the president is the decision 
maker for the federal government, which is the prosecutor’s client, it may be 
the rare case where a prosecutor rejects the president’s direction on ethical 
grounds, and rarer still where a prosecutor rejects a presidential direction that 
is predicated on foreign policy.  As chief executive, the president has an 
overarching duty to make foreign policy decisions in order to keep the 
country safe, and prosecutors cannot claim to have superior expertise or 
authority in that realm.  Surely, federal prosecutors cannot substitute their 
own foreign policy preferences for those of the president.  But even so, it 
does not follow that a federal prosecutor may defer to all presidential 
decisions that are purportedly in furtherance of foreign policy objectives.  
Just as a federal prosecutor must disobey a direction to act lawlessly, at times 
the prosecutor must disobey directions that reflect a clear abuse of fiduciary 
duty by the president.  A claimed foreign policy objective may be 
pretextual—a cover for a decision patently based on illegitimate 
considerations.  And even when the claimed foreign policy objective is 
genuine, it is not invariably legitimate for the federal government to use its 
criminal justice authority to advance a foreign policy objective.  The 
government may have to further that objective by other means, not by 
contravening criminal justice norms and traditions. 
How the professional conduct rules play out, in the situation where a 
federal prosecutor concludes that the president is breaching his fiduciary 
duty, is far from settled given the novelty of a presidential intrusion into 
criminal prosecutions.  If a court regarded a prosecution as sufficiently 
abusive, it might conclude that the prosecutor was subject to discipline for 
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice”70 or, in the more 
extreme case, for having assisted a client in unlawful conduct.  But even if 
not, carrying out the president’s direction would seem to be at odds with the 
ordinary requirement, analogous to the corporate lawyer’s duty in the 
corporate representation context, to resist direction given by unfaithful 
fiduciaries.71  The prosecutor could advise the president against the chosen 
action.  Sometimes, when an entity’s representative engages in improper 
decision-making, the entity’s lawyer is expected to go “up the ladder,”72 but 
in this setting there may be no higher for a prosecutor to go in search of 
 
 70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (proscribing 
“conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”). 
 71. See generally William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 489 (2016) (discussing the fallacy of identifying the organization’s managers as the 
clients of the organization’s lawyer). 
 72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing 
that, in certain circumstances in which an entity’s constituent acts unlawfully, the entity’s 
lawyer “shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted 
by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as 
determined by applicable law”). 
1836 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
direction.73  If the prosecutor cannot dissuade the president, the imperative 
under professional conduct rules may simply be for the prosecutor to refuse 
to carry out the president’s instructions. 
III.  THE PRESIDENT AS THE PROSECUTOR’S BOSS 
President Trump’s assertion of exclusive authority over prosecutors 
suggests a second way to conceptualize claimed presidential authority over 
criminal prosecutions.  According to this understanding, the president, as 
chief executive, is the chief prosecutor in charge of all federal prosecution 
and has chosen to delegate this authority to lawyers within the DOJ.74  
Although federal prosecutors are employed by the United States or one of its 
agencies, the president, under this conception, is the federal prosecutors’ boss 
and, for that reason, the person with ultimate authority over federal 
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions—both those made on behalf of the 
public as client and those made as the public’s lawyer.  Because the president, 
in this view, takes on the full role of prosecutor, the president can make 
decisions in a criminal prosecution about “means” that are ordinarily within 
the province of the lawyer. 
This conception evokes different ethical concerns—namely, concerns 
about the improper influence of nonlawyers on the practice of law.  
Preliminarily, not all presidents are lawyers.  Even those who are lawyers do 
not act in that capacity.  They are, in essence, nonlawyers.75  If the president 
 
 73. In some situations, a government lawyer may fulfill the up-the-ladder reporting 
requirement by going over the president’s head to Congress. See Note, Government Counsel 
and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1425 (2008).  But the analogy between 
Congress and a private corporation’s board of directors is imperfect.  Confidentiality 
considerations may limit prosecutors’ ability to make disclosures to Congress about pending 
cases and, in any event, it seems plain that, on separation-of-powers grounds, Congress could 
not give direction to prosecutors. 
 74. There are legal and historical problems with this conception that we discuss in our 
earlier paper.  For instance, federal prosecution was not originally an exclusively executive 
power.  Private individuals and state actors brought federal criminal charges in the early 
republic. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 15, 42.  Further, the authority to prosecute is 
delegated to federal prosecutors by congressional legislation, not by presidential decree. Id. at 
35–37, 49.  Here, however, we are discussing a different set of problems with this conception, 
namely, those raised by prosecutors’ professional obligations and by the constitutional concept 
of separation of powers. 
 75. Most professional conduct rules are applicable only in situations where lawyers are 
practicing law. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(providing that lawyers rendering law-related services are not subject to the rules governing 
the lawyer-client relationship if they clarify that they are not practicing law).  Lawyers who 
are not practicing law are regulated primarily by professional conduct rules proscribing 
criminal, fraudulent, and dishonest or deceitful conduct.  In some situations, even the general 
rule subjecting lawyers to discipline for dishonesty and deceit is inapplicable. See, e.g., D.C. 
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 323 (2004), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/ 
opinions/opinion323.cfm [https://perma.cc/M4SR-MZ7X] (explaining that government 
agency lawyers who are not engaged in legal representations may engage in deceit where 
legally authorized in furtherance of their official duties); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 
Comm., Op. 02-05 (2002), http://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2002-05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2FH-U4RR] (stating “that as long as a prosecutor’s or other governmental 
lawyer’s conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation is part of an 
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is the chief prosecutor with full prosecutorial power and has delegated 
authority to lawyers within the DOJ, then we run into problems analogous to 
those at the heart of unauthorized practice of law provisions.  A nonlawyer 
cannot appear before courts, argue motions, or perform other tasks typically 
reserved to lawyers.76  Nonlawyers do not have the requisite training and are 
not governed by the ethics rules.77  The risk, at the heart of these provisions, 
is that without proper training and with no professional commitment to the 
applicable ethics code, nonlawyers will undermine the legal system rather 
than uphold it.78 
In general, professional norms presuppose that lawyers will exercise 
“professional independence” in several senses, including independence from 
nonlawyers who might impermissibly influence their conduct.79  These 
expectations are, to some extent, codified in professional conduct rules that 
restrict lawyers’ relationship with nonlawyers in order to prevent 
relationships that would leave the lawyer susceptible to improper lay 
influence.  These include rules against fee splitting with nonlawyers and 
against forming law partnerships with nonlawyer partners or investors.80  The 
purpose behind these rules, like that behind the prohibition on the 
unauthorized practice of law, is to ensure that the integrity of the legal system 
is not eroded by the private interest of individuals who owe no obligation to 
the courts and may not share the same ethical responsibility to the client.81 
This is not to say that lawyers cannot be supervised by nonlawyers, 
whether individuals or entities.  Subject to restrictions, they obviously may 
 
otherwise lawful government operation, the prosecutor or other governmental lawyer does not 
violate” the ethical rules). 
 76. Most states have statutes banning the unauthorized practice of law. See Barlow F. 
Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:  Do Good Fences Really Make Good 
Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 180–81, 191–92 (1980); see 
also Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—the Role of 
the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth 
Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 66–68 (2009) (tracing the adoption and development of 
unauthorized practice of law restrictions in the 1920s and 1930s).  The ABA has an ethics rule 
referencing unauthorized practice of law provisions. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 77. See, e.g., Rules of Admission, N.Y. CTS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/attorneys/ 
admissions/rules.shtml [https://perma.cc/J7DU-EK4E] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 78. One might imagine a comparable problem if the president, invoking his authority as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, sought to fly military airplanes without a pilot’s 
license or, instead, sought from the ground to give direction on how a pilot should fly a plane.  
The authority to make certain big military decisions does not necessarily imply the power to 
make all military decisions. 
 79. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(1988); Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or Undervalued?, 
46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013). 
 80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (titled 
“Professional Independence of a Lawyer” and restricting, inter alia, sharing legal fees with 
nonlawyers and having nonlawyer partners and investors in law firms). 
 81. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary 
Practice:  Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values 
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2000) (discussing the history and development of 
professional restrictions now incorporated in ABA Model Rule 5.4). 
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be.  Besides working as agents of nonlawyer clients, lawyers are employed 
“in-house” in corporations, not-for-profit organizations, and government 
agencies.  In these settings, lawyers typically provide legal services to the 
entities that employ them, but, subject to restrictions, they may also provide 
legal services to third parties.  In either case, the entity may be headed by a 
nonlawyer, who may have authority to hire or fire the lawyer and to whom 
the lawyer must answer as to certain matters.  But even so, employed lawyers 
must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client to 
avoid lay influence on their representation.  For example, a lawyer in a not-
for-profit agency providing legal assistance to its constituents may not share 
client confidences with the agency’s nonlawyer directors, much less take 
direction from them regarding the representation of individual clients.82 
It is unclear how much influence a government lawyer may allow a 
nonlawyer superior to exercise over her professional judgment in carrying 
out the client’s objectives.  Suppose that a government lawyer served in an 
executive regulatory agency headed by a nonlawyer.  In this scenario, the 
client is the regulatory agency, and it acts through the agency head.83  The 
agency head may decide the objectives of the representation and discuss with 
the lawyer how to achieve them.  The lawyer may share confidential 
information with the agency head and receive the agency head’s views.  But 
conventionally, as discussed in Part I, the lawyer decides on the “means” to 
carry out the client’s objectives.84  Therefore, it seems doubtful that the 
 
 82. See N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 1997-2 (1997), 
http://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/ 
detail/formal-opinion-1997-2-confidentiality-of-information-concerning-child-abuse-or-
mistreatment-preservation-of-confidences-within-a-social-services-agency-advanced-
consent-to-the-disclosure-of-client-confidences-and-secrets [https://perma.cc/9FY9-BZQS] 
(stating that “the lawyer [who] is employed by, and thus compensated by, a social services 
agency” shall “represent her clients with independent professional judgment” and must “not 
allow the agency to direct or regulate her professional judgment in rendering legal services to 
clients”). 
 83. W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS 
L.J. 275, 303 (2017) (“A government lawyer’s client is generally the represented agency, 
exercising its authority through officers authorized to make decisions on behalf of the 
agency.”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  For 
analyses of the role and responsibilities of government agency lawyers, see generally Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1293 (1987); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency 
Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (2002).  For analyses of the roles and responsibilities of 
civil government lawyers or of government lawyers performing other specific functions on 
the civil side, see generally Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values:  Can, 
Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000); 
Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033 
(2007); Keith A. Petty, Professional Responsibility Compliance and National Security 
Attorneys:  Adopting the Normative Framework of Internalized Legal Ethics, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 1563; William H. Simon, The Professional Responsibilities of the Public Official’s 
Lawyer:  A Case Study from the Clinton Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 999 (2002). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 23–27; see also McCoy v. Alabama, 138 S. Ct. 
1500, 1508 (2018) (“Trial management is the lawyer’s province:  Counsel provides his or her 
assistance by making decisions such as ‘what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary 
objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.’  
Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client—notably, whether to plead guilty, waive 
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agency head, as the client’s representative, would be entitled to call the shots 
regarding “means” or strategy—that is, regarding decisions about how to 
achieve the client’s ends.  Nor could the agency head do so as the lawyer’s 
supervisor.  In general, lawyers as their clients’ agents determine the “means” 
because of various considerations—primarily their presumed expertise, as 
well as the practical difficulty of obtaining client direction as to each decision 
and lawyers’ own reputational interest in the quality and ethical nature of 
their work.85  The argument for lawyer decision-making is, if anything, more 
compelling when the client is an entity rather than an individual because the 
lawyer acts for the benefit of the entity, not the supervisor, and therefore, 
when the supervisor gives direction, the entity is not necessarily assuming 
the risk of bad strategic decisions.  In hiring a lawyer, an entity is ordinarily 
deciding to seek the benefit of the lawyer’s legal judgment and expertise and 
authorizing the lawyer to make decisions that lawyers conventionally 
make.86 
Suppose that, in the hypothetical prosecution of a foreign national, the 
president, while anticipating that the case will ultimately be dismissed, 
directs the prosecutor to file nonfrivolous motions and take other steps to 
delay the resolution of the case in order to sustain leverage against the nation 
that is holding a U.S. citizen as a prisoner.  Assuming that filing motions to 
secure delay is not itself ethically proscribed,87 the question of whether to 
file motions is a question of “means” not “ends,” although one can debate the 
relevant objective.  Ordinarily, in a criminal case, the objectives include, 
among others, serving the ends of the criminal law (e.g., punishing or 
incapacitating some of those who commit a crime and deterring others from 
committing the crime), assuring the accused a fair process, protecting the 
integrity of the legal system, and conserving public resources.  Questions 
about whether to expedite or delay proceedings (within the bounds of the 
law) and about whether and what motions to file are clearly strategic 
decisions of the sort that, in civil litigation, would be entrusted to the lawyer.  
One may posit that the government’s principal objective in this atypical 
scenario has little to do with U.S. criminal justice and that the entire 
 
the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” (quoting Gonzalez 
v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008))). 
 85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Clients 
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to 
be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical 
matters.”). 
 86. The argument for lawyers’ professional independence seems even stronger in the 
criminal context than in the civil regulatory context.  Suppose, for example, that a municipality 
does not elect its prosecutor but, as is sometimes the case, contracts with a private practitioner 
to prosecute criminal cases. See Maybell Romero, Profit-Driven Prosecution and the 
Competitive Bidding Process, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 185–87 (2017).  The 
municipality’s chief executive may nominally be the prosecutor’s boss and may have authority 
to hire or fire the prosecutor, but the prosecutor would not be expected to discuss individual 
cases with the executive, much less to take direction from the executive about decisions in 
individual cases. 
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”). 
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prosecution is a “means” to secure the return of the U.S. citizen (albeit, as 
discussed above, a dubious means).  But even then, although the objectives 
of the litigation would be expanded, questions of timing and motions in the 
litigation would still be strategic ones ordinarily entrusted to the lawyer who 
is responsible for the litigation, not to the client.  While the prosecutor could 
take account of the public interest in securing a citizen’s release, the 
prosecutor could not ignore the public interests in fair criminal process and 
in avoiding punishment of the innocent, and those interests would foreclose 
delaying the proceedings to secure leverage with an unfriendly foreign 
nation. 
In general, under conventional understandings about the lawyer-client 
relationship, the prosecutor would be obligated to exercise independent 
professional judgment notwithstanding the prosecutor’s subordinate 
employment relationship to the president.88  Most obviously, the prosecutor 
could not follow direction to act illegally or unethically.  For example, the 
prosecutor could not follow a direction to file frivolous motions coming from 
the president as his supervisor any more than from another client 
representative (or client). 
But even if deleterious motion practice and requests for continuances 
would not be unlawful or unethical per se, the prosecutor could not 
reflexively accept the president’s direction.  On the contrary, the prosecutor 
would be expected to conclude that it runs counter to the norms and 
expectations of criminal prosecution—to the concept of “seeking justice”—
to continue and prolong an individual’s prosecution (and potentially prolong 
his imprisonment), in anticipation that the defendant will never be convicted 
and does not deserve to be, in order to serve foreign policy objectives having 
nothing to do with this defendant’s culpability.  If a prosecutor reached that 
conclusion, it would be unethical for her to follow the nonlawyer supervisor’s 
direction, even if that supervisor was the president.  The president, as the 
prosecutor’s boss, could fire the prosecutor, just as a corporate chief 
executive or board of directors could fire the corporation’s in-house general 
counsel or outside counsel.  But even so, from a conventional ethics 
perspective, a lawyer serving as prosecutor may not accept the nonlawyer 
supervisor’s direction about how to achieve the government entity client’s 
lawful objectives but must exercise independent professional judgment. 
This means that, insofar as the president gives direction to the Attorney 
General, who is plainly the president’s subordinate, the Attorney General 
may not simply direct the trial prosecutor to implement that direction.  If the 
Attorney General, as a lawyer, assumes responsibility for making “means” 
decisions, he must make an independent professional judgment about how to 
achieve the legitimate objectives of the representation, which, in any criminal 
case, entail doing justice.  The deliberative process permits giving the 
president’s preferences only as much weight as they appropriately deserve, 
but not automatically privileging them.  If the Attorney General simply 
 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 72–78. 
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serves in an administrative capacity as a conduit for the president’s direction, 
then it is the trial prosecutor or other subordinate prosecutor authorized to 
conduct the representation who must engage in the requisite independent 
decision-making.89 
IV.  THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS DILEMMA 
Our first article on the president’s ability to control the DOJ argued that 
prosecutors serve as an important limit on presidential power.  It contributed 
to a growing dialog about intrabranch checks and balances.90  Relying on 
relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that article concluded that Congress 
has the power to allocate authority to prosecutors within the DOJ.91  By 
examining the specific professional norms at issue, this Article turns to a 
different but related issue:  the interbranch separation-of-powers problems 
that would inevitably accompany a president’s decision to direct individual 
prosecutorial decisions.  This Part concludes that allowing the president the 
power to control federal prosecutors would undermine separation of powers 
by stripping courts of the ability to protect themselves from executive 
encroachment.  This allocation of power to the president would not further 
the executive’s constitutionally defined task of taking care that the laws are 
enforced faithfully.  Instead, it would impair the courts’ ability to perform 
their core function:  deciding criminal cases according to fact and law.92 
There are two related separation-of-powers issues raised by our discussion 
of prosecutorial ethics.  First, the claim of presidential power to control 
criminal prosecutions interferes with the inherent authority of federal courts 
and the statutory authority of state courts to regulate lawyers.  There are, 
therefore, two competing claims by two different branches of government 
regarding the power at issue.  It might not seem immediately apparent which 
branch should win out or whether the branches ought to just do battle in any 
 
 89. Of course, if the Attorney General purports to exercise independent professional 
judgment but apparently defaults on this responsibility, paying unquestionable obeisance to 
the president, the subordinate prosecutor will have an ethical dilemma regarding whether to 
accept the Attorney General’s direction, as would any subordinate lawyer receiving direction 
from a supervisory lawyer who appears to be acting in bad faith.  How the federal prosecutor 
might navigate this dilemma is an interesting question but one beyond the scope of this Article.  
For purposes of this Article’s analysis, we assume that all the government lawyers are 
motivated to behave ethically, insofar as they can discern what professional ethics requires. 
 90. Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 91. Id. at 34–38. 
 92. As administrative law scholars have pointed out, the formalist view of the division of 
authority between the branches is difficult to apply to the modern administrative state.  
Agencies combine judicial, legislative, and executive elements, and it is impossible to imagine 
separating out these roles in the modern complex society. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and 
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—a Foolish Inconsistency?, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–93 (1987).  Strauss argues that the key question is whether the 
agency’s relationship with the president, members of Congress, or judges undermines the 
intended distribution of authority among the three.  For an argument that criminal law 
separation of powers ought to be treated differently from administrative agencies and ought to 
follow a formalist approach, see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990–97 (2006). 
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given case.  We conclude that the conflict is illusory because the president’s 
power and obligation is to “take Care” that the laws are executed “faithfully.”  
This obligation presupposes playing by the rules.93  As we argue above, in 
order to play by the rules, the president has to rely on trained prosecutors who 
will follow the ethical traditions of the profession rather than assume 
responsibility himself or delegate to someone else in the executive branch 
who has no such professional duty and other potentially conflicting interests. 
Second, if we were to allow presidential authority over law enforcement 
to trump ethics rules enforced by courts and endorsed by Congress, we risk 
significantly weakening an independent judiciary.  If we were to assume an 
anomalous world in which the president can direct prosecutors’ decisions and 
courts are free to sanction prosecutors for following those directions, courts 
would be significantly impaired in their ability to perform their core 
function—deciding individual cases according to law and fact.  To exercise 
this function properly, courts rely on an independent bar.  Specifically, they 
rely on independent prosecutors to develop and pursue cases according to 
professional norms.94  While courts possess the theoretical capacity to police 
these norms, doing so in practice is difficult, if not impossible.  The 
professional norms at issue here are more than just rules of practice.  They 
intersect significantly with constitutional rights and provide the backbone for 
the integrity of the criminal justice system.95  As arbiters within that system, 
who are tasked with deciding cases in a fair and impartial way, judges depend 
on prosecutors to follow these rules.  They depend on prosecutors to provide 
them with reliable facts and ensure the integrity of the system by adhering to 
the norms, traditions, and ethical requirements of prosecution.  Allowing a 
president the power to render these norms meaningless would interfere with 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary.96 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison rested on an argument about 
constitutional separation of powers.97  Based on his understanding of the 
constitutional text and history, Justice Scalia argued for a strict division of 
tasks between the three branches of government.98  In Morrison, he assumed 
 
 93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 94. For an argument about how central norms are to democratic government, see generally 
Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018). 
 95. See infra Part III.B. 
 96. The courts’ ability to protect and police the power of the judicial branch against 
incursion from other branches is well established. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); 
see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (“An informed, 
independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar.”).  Emphasizing the way in 
which courts depend on prosecutors does not and should not minimize the role that courts play 
in policing prosecutors.  Prosecutors often violate their ethical obligations, and courts are 
among the important checks on such abuse, but there is a significant amount of professional 
conduct that courts cannot regulate both because they must respect the boundaries of the 
executive branch and because it is difficult if not impossible for courts to oversee the conduct. 
 97. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id.  Justice Scalia was a proponent of the “formalist” approach to separation of powers.  
Formalists assume that the Constitution, through the vesting clauses, has completely divided 
federal government authority between the three branches. Gary Lawson, Territorial 
Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 857–58 (1990).  
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that because prosecution is a “purely”99 executive power, it must be exercised 
by the executive branch alone.100  Critics of Justice Scalia’s separation-of-
powers theory have argued that, in fact, he departed from the text and history 
in order to further his ideological agenda of enhancing the power of the 
executive at the expense of the other branches of government and did so 
under the guise of an evenhanded application of the Constitution as it was 
written and intended.101 
This Part adds a dimension to this critique by demonstrating how Justice 
Scalia’s view of prosecutorial power misinterpreted the nature of federal 
prosecution (both at the founding and today) and ignores powers traditionally 
exercised by Congress and the federal judiciary.  While it is true that 
prosecution is an executive function, it is a function that can be controlled by 
Congress and overlaps significantly with the judiciary as well.102  By acting 
as if this is not so, Justice Scalia’s dissent masked that its understanding 
would impair the power of courts and the legislature to regulate prosecutors 
and significantly weaken the core function of an independent judiciary.103  
This Part will take up each of these two separation-of-powers concerns in 
turn. 
A.  The Courts’ and Legislature’s Power to Regulate Prosecutors 
Few would suggest that a prosecutor may follow a president’s direction to 
break the law—for example, by suborning perjury or withholding material 
exculpatory evidence.  And it is unlikely that anyone would take the position 
that a prosecutor may follow a president’s direction to violate any and all 
rules of professional conduct and judicial standards governing lawyers’ 
conduct.  It would be perverse, for example, to argue that a prosecutor may, 
 
Functionalists, on the other hand, believe that the Constitution is largely silent about the tasks 
assigned to different branches.  Given this silence, most of the work of structuring the federal 
government lies with Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Peter S. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 573, 597–99 (1984).  Formalists prefer a strict division of power among the branches, 
and functionalists favor a balance. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary 
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1946 (2011).  Functionalists also tolerate shared 
responsibilities as long as they do not interfere with a “core” function of any branch. Strauss, 
supra note 92, at 512–22.  A third set of scholars seeks a pragmatic middle ground.  They 
suggest that separation-of-powers analysis should focus on preventing a single branch from 
accumulating too much power and that the Constitution equips each branch with the power to 
protect itself and police the others. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2000); Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial 
Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 362–65. 
 99. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 704–05. 
 101. Reisman, supra note 16, at 50–53. 
 102. As James Madison argued, the separation of powers does not necessarily require a 
strict division of authority. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  And, in fact, some 
blending of powers may ensure that one branch is able to prevent the encroachment of another. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 103. In our earlier article, we argued that characterizing prosecution as a pure executive 
power is not in keeping with the history of prosecution in the early American republic. Green 
& Roiphe, supra note 2, at 12–15. 
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much less must, lie to the court (or to anyone else) if the president so directs.  
Even so, there is no caveat in the theory of complete presidential control over 
prosecution that makes this point clear, and it is at least conceivable that a 
president might respond as then-former President Nixon did in an interview 
with the journalist David Frost, “when the President does it, that means that 
it is not illegal.”104 
But even if one were to take the more modest view that the president 
cannot direct a prosecutor to break the law or violate core ethical principles, 
the professional conduct norms discussed in Parts II and III may seem, at first 
blush, less important.  As discussed above, the premise that the president may 
make all decisions in any given federal prosecution would not require 
prosecutors to violate rules directly governing relations with the court or third 
parties.  Rather, presidential control potentially conflicts with professional 
conduct rules and norms governing lawyers’ relationship with clients, 
particularly entity clients, concerning questions about who makes decisions 
and how decisions are to be made. 
The professional rules concerning entity representation and nonlawyer 
influence were not embodied in common-law agency decisions but 
developed well after the Constitution was written.105  There is no reason to 
believe that the constitutional framers expected prosecutors to be bound by 
these specific rules in whatever interactions they might have with the 
president.  But, at the core, the professional conduct rules in question 
implement a notion of lawyers’ professional independence that has been 
fundamental to the role of the American lawyer since this country’s 
founding.106  It would be hard to make a principled argument that the 
presidential authority to direct federal prosecutions is subordinate to 
professional conduct rules in general but that these particular rules are an 
exception.  Nor could it plausibly be argued that prosecutors’ independence 
is less important than that of other lawyers. 
In order to perform their work adequately, courts assume that prosecutors 
treat similar cases alike and exclude illegitimate considerations in 
prosecuting cases.  Ethics rules, customs, and practices of prosecutors’ 
offices help ensure this is so.  Unlike career prosecutors, the president would 
not decide against the background of prior decisions and DOJ traditions and 
probably cannot avoid interjecting impermissible considerations.  The 
federal court’s deference to prosecutors’ exercise of discretion presupposes 
 
 104. See supra note 26; see also Excerpts from Interview with Richard Nixon About 
Domestic Effects of Indochina War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16.  President Trump’s 
lawyers have implied that they may share this view. Letter from Marc E. Kasowitz to Robert 
S. Mueller, supra note 1.  The president has also implied this himself. Excerpts from Trump’s 
Interview with the Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/ 
us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html [https://perma.cc/FBJ4-3WYL] (“I have absolute 
right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”). 
 105. Roger N. Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
24 WASHBURN L.J. 443, 444–45 (1985). 
 106. Gordon, supra note 79, at 30–68; Green, supra note 68, at 602–08. 
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prosecutors’ professional commitment to seeking justice and to the norms, 
rules, and traditions that promote and protect that pursuit.107 
This assumption about prosecutors’ conduct both supports and presumes 
prosecutorial independence.108  Of course, at times, courts do have to 
question whether prosecutors are behaving ethically.  But as a general matter, 
the presumption that they are committed to the traditional norms of 
prosecution allows prosecutors to do their job.109  It makes their work easier 
because, for example, judges generally take prosecutors at their word and 
assume that there is probable cause to support their arrests and indictments.  
If the DOJ takes the position that the president may control it and courts do 
not know when the president has directly intervened in discretionary 
decisions, prosecutors may lose the benefit of the presumption in all cases.  
Not knowing whether prosecutors are or are not adhering to the traditional 
expectations in any given case, courts may mistrust them in all cases, making 
it harder for prosecutors to do their job and significantly altering (and likely 
undermining) the criminal process.110 
Ethics rules governing prosecutorial conduct in general, and 
disinterestedness in particular, are not only professional norms, but also a key 
tool in the administration of justice and therefore fundamental to a 
functioning independent judiciary.  While superficially appealing in its 
simplicity, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison overlooks the complexity of 
government functioning in general and prosecution in particular.  In claiming 
that prosecution is a pure executive power, Justice Scalia misrepresented the 
early history of prosecution in this country, which demonstrates a complex 
tradition in which federal prosecution was shared by private individuals, 
states, and to some extent the judiciary.111  It is not surprising then that he 
 
 107. Fish, supra note 19, at 238–44; Green, supra note 44, at 618–37. 
 108. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423–24 (1976) (“The office of public prosecutor 
is one which must be administered with courage and independence.  Yet how can this be if the 
prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict?  To allow 
this would open the way for unlimited harassment and embarrassment of the most 
conscientious officials by those who would profit thereby.  There would be involved in every 
case the possible consequences of a failure to obtain a conviction.  There would always be a 
question of possible civil action in case the prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the 
case. . . .  The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness and 
toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should characterize the 
administration of this office.  The work of the prosecutor would thus be impeded and we would 
have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law enforcement.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935))). 
 109. See id. at 422–23. 
 110. If courts were to develop a practice of asking prosecutors to reveal whether or not their 
decisions are their own or those of the administration, this too could put prosecutors in an 
ethical bind.  If the president is akin to the representative of a client, then revealing the 
information might be a violation of confidences. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  If the president is a nonlawyer employer, then the prosecutor may 
well face employment consequences for answering. 
 111. Justice Scalia’s inaccurate treatment of history leads to a distorted view of the three 
branches of government.  Many scholars have pointed out how blended the obligations of the 
different branches were.  Federal prosecution was shared by private individuals and states. 
See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, supra note 2, at 70; Krent, supra note 7, at 290–310; Reisman, 
supra note 16, at 50–51.  Historians have shown that the obligations of different branches were 
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glossed over the contemporary and deeply rooted reality that the judiciary 
shares an important part of the prosecution function by, among other things, 
regulating prosecutors’ conduct.  By fiat, Justice Scalia’s approach would 
transfer the entire law enforcement function to the executive branch in 
general and to the president in particular.  Under the guise of neutrally 
applying the text and history of the Constitution, his theory would in fact 
alter the balance between the three branches by shifting power from the 
federal courts and Congress to the executive. 
One can rationalize presidential authority over federal prosecutors on the 
theory that while the president’s executive power does not displace all 
professional conduct rules, it supersedes those particular contemporary rules 
that have the effect of limiting or impeding the president’s authority to direct 
the conduct of criminal prosecutions.  In other words, if court-adopted rules 
or standards have the effect of denying the president the ability to make 
otherwise-lawful prosecution decisions by putting prosecutors at risk of 
discipline for complying with the president’s decisions, then the rules or 
standards are preempted by Article II of the Constitution. 
The argument seems to set up a direct constitutional conflict between 
executive branch authority, on one hand, and both judicial and congressional 
authority, on the other.  That is because the professional conduct rules and 
standards are expressions of both judicial and legislative power. 
In general, prosecutors, as lawyers, are subject to the supervisory authority 
of both the courts that have licensed them and, if different, the courts before 
which they appear.112  Thus, federal prosecutors are subject to the 
professional conduct rules of their licensing jurisdictions and the rules and 
court-made law of the federal courts in which they prosecute.113  For the most 
part, prosecutors accept the relevance of these various norms.  Although 
federal courts are highly deferential to prosecutors’ discretionary decision-
making, particularly as to charging and plea bargaining,114 prosecutors have 
 
shared from the outset in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Christine A. Desan, The 
Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383–84 (1998). 
 112. Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors:  Do Too Many Regulators Produce 
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 73–74 (1995). 
 113. Federal courts have broad common-law authority “to supervise and discipline lawyers 
who appear before them.” Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee:  On the 
Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 530–31 (1989).  In addition, federal 
courts have general supervisory authority over the conduct of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).  For a discussion of the supervisory 
power of courts in criminal cases, see generally Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power 
of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering 
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:  Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority 
of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the 
Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (1969); and Lisa H. Wallach, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in the Grand Jury:  Dismissal of Indictments Pursuant to the Federal Supervisory 
Power, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 135–39 (1987). 
 114. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 (1978) (deferring to prosecutors’ decisions 
in plea bargaining); United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that judges should not engage in detailed oversight of prosecutors’ decisions in plea 
bargaining and charging); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–
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not persuaded courts that, as executive branch officials, they are not bound 
by the court’s professional regulation.115 
The question of whether federal prosecutors are exempt from certain areas 
of professional regulation was litigated most vigorously several decades ago 
in the context of the professional conduct rule restricting lawyers’ direct 
communications with represented persons.116  Invoking this rule, some courts 
concluded that prosecutors and their investigators may be restricted from 
conducting otherwise-lawful questioning of represented suspects or 
defendants without their lawyers’ consent.117  Anticipating that additional 
courts might adopt restrictive readings of the rules, the DOJ issued a 
memorandum, known as the Thornburgh Memo, which purported to 
authorize federal prosecutors to undertake investigative measures in potential 
derogation of the professional conduct rules.118  When courts questioned the 
policy’s authority, the DOJ responded by implementing the federal 
rulemaking process to promulgate a federal regulation, known as the Reno 
Regulation, to similar effect.119  The Eighth Circuit held that the Reno 
Regulation was unenforceable,120 and the DOJ abandoned its reliance on the 
regulation soon thereafter when Congress adopted a law, known as the 
McDade Amendment,121 which requires federal prosecutors to abide by the 
professional conduct rules of the states in which they prosecute.122 
In other contexts, questions might be raised regarding which body, as 
between state courts, federal courts, or Congress, should establish and 
enforce professional conduct regulation for federal prosecutors.  Depending 
on the subject of the regulation, one or the other may have a stronger claim.123  
For example, the federal courts before which prosecutors appear may have 
the stronger claim to apply their professional conduct rules for trial lawyers 
in order to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings; state courts may have 
the stronger claim to apply rules relating generally to prosecutors’ character 
and fitness to practice law; and Congress may have the stronger claim to 
adopt legislation, such as the Jencks Act,124 that explicitly regulates the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions.  In this case, however, the question of how 
 
80 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that, based on separation of powers, courts will not review a 
prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges). 
 115. Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the 
court’s power to regulate federal prosecutors). 
 116. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 
88 GEO. L.J. 207, 211–14 (2000). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839–40 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 118. Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All 
Justice Dep’t Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489–93 
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 119. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995). 
 120. United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th 
Cir. 1998). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012). 
 122. Zacharias & Green, supra note 116, at 211–16 (describing the legislative history and 
substance of the McDade Amendment). 
 123. See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 13. 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). 
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to allocate authority among these regulatory bodies is of no moment because 
all three have regulated in essentially the same way—state and federal courts 
through the adoption of similar sets of rules, and Congress through the 
McDade Amendment—and, therefore, federal prosecutors are not subject to 
inconsistent regulation.  The question, instead, is whether any or all of these 
bodies may adopt regulations for prosecutors, as lawyers, that have the effect 
of frustrating presidential control of federal criminal prosecutions. 
In general, executive branch action must take place within the bounds of 
the law—that is, within the bounds of legislation or, in litigation, law made 
by judges pursuant to their inherent or rulemaking authority.125  Here, the 
law in question regulates lawyers and is not specifically directed at 
government lawyers, though it has implications for them.  At a level of 
generality, it seems obvious that lawyer regulation is among the laws within 
the confines of which the executive branch must function.  A sweeping claim 
that the president, or the executive branch in general, is above, or unbound 
by, the law that regulates lawyers in criminal proceedings would have little 
credibility.126  The Constitution assigns the president the task to “take Care” 
that the laws are faithfully executed.127 
Proponents of presidential power over criminal prosecutions might argue 
that the law here is different because, while directed at lawyers generally and 
therefore applicable to lawyers in the executive branch, the particular 
professional conduct rules do not restrict action.  They regulate how 
decisions to act are made.  Their effect in criminal prosecutions is arguably 
to regulate how decision-making authority is allocated within the executive 
branch and the criteria governing otherwise lawful decisions.  No doubt, 
Congress can define crimes and restrict how the executive branch 
investigates and proves them, and courts can restrict prosecutors’ in-court 
conduct, all of which may have the effect of limiting executive branch 
authority.  But one might argue that it is a greater intrusion, and different in 
kind, to dictate the internal decision-making process and criteria for decisions 
that are entrusted to the executive branch.128 
We find this argument unpersuasive.  To begin with, it misconceives the 
ethics rules in question.  The rules are not fundamentally different from 
others adopted by courts to regulate lawyers’ professional conduct in the 
courtroom.  The rules are prophylactic ones that protect the lawyer from third 
parties’ improper influences—that of the client’s faithless fiduciary or the 
lawyer’s nonlawyer supervisor.  But many rules are prophylactic, including 
 
 125. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
777, 807 (2012). 
 126. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714–16 (1974); United States v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.”). 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 128. There are certainly precedents for such restrictions.  For example, federal legislation 
allowing some juveniles to be tried in federal court rather than transferred to state authorities 
sets the criteria for prosecutors’ decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012).  For an argument that 
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Beale, supra note 113, at 1520–22. 
2019] FEDERAL PROSECUTORS AND THE PRESIDENT 1849 
those governing conflicts of interest.129  At the core, these rules, like the 
conflict of interest rules, protect the fundamental professional value of 
lawyer fidelity to the client.130  And in the context of prosecution, where the 
client is the public, they ensure the integrity of the case. 
The importance of the ethics rules discussed above relates to the second 
separation-of-powers concern, which we discuss next. 
B.  Undermining a Core Function of an Independent Judiciary 
Stripping states, Congress, and the federal courts of the ability to regulate 
prosecutors would violate the constitutional separation-of-powers principles 
by undermining the core power of courts to decide criminal cases according 
to fact and law.  Judicial independence was just as central at the founding as 
executive power.131  Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison ignored how 
his theory of presidential control over federal prosecution would affect the 
judiciary.  At the very least, this consequence ought to factor into any 
separation-of-powers analysis.  If not, what seems an uncontroversial textual 
reading of discrete executive power is masking what is, in fact, a significant 
diminution of the judicial role. 
In the context of prosecution in particular, the rules regarding a lawyer’s 
independence from the client play a far more foundational role than it might 
at first seem to.  They serve to promote and ensure prosecutors’ “duty to do 
justice,” a principle recognized by the Court in Berger.132  This duty dates 
back long before the founding and was clearly intended to be a central part 
of American criminal justice.133  The rules discussed in the first three parts 
of the Article are not merely etiquette for lawyers, but rather a way of 
ensuring disinterested decision-making, which is not only a key professional 
norm but also fundamental to the proper functioning of the judiciary.  As the 
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Court held in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,134 “An informed, 
independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar.”135  In 
Velazquez, the Court invalidated restrictions that conditioned the petitioner’s 
funding on its willingness to forgo challenges to certain welfare regulations 
as impermissible viewpoint discrimination.136  The professional norms at 
issue here are at least as important to maintaining and nurturing an 
independent bar, which, as the Court explained, is necessary for the 
functioning of an independent judiciary.137  These prosecutorial norms help 
to ensure that investigations and prosecutions are conducted in a proper and 
evenhanded way and that the facts developed in an investigation and 
judgments about the relevance of those facts are trustworthy.138  This 
particular form of disinterested decision-making is unlikely and perhaps even 
impossible for a president to employ given the conflicting demands of the 
president’s other duties, the president’s conflicting policy and political 
commitments, and the president’s lack of training, experience, and expertise 
in prosecutorial decision-making. 
In the case of prosecutors, the core value of professional independence 
implicates the integrity of the criminal justice system and the courts as a 
whole.  The effect of the rules in the context of criminal prosecutions, as 
discussed, has been to ensure disinterested prosecutorial decision-making in 
accordance with both the judicial expectation and the prosecutorial tradition 
of “seeking justice.”  To a degree, the obligation to seek justice is elaborated 
in the professional conduct rules.139  To a greater degree, judicial opinions 
have elaborated on prosecutors’ distinctive professional obligations, which 
are rooted in this general concept.140  Courts’ supervision of criminal 
prosecutions has built up around the assumption that prosecutors’ offices are 
committed to this understanding.141  Stripped of their ability to rely on 
independent prosecutors playing by the rules, courts would be significantly 
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hobbled in one of their central functions, namely, checking the power of the 
executive and preventing prosecutorial overreach.142 
Judicial expectations of prosecutors are not particularly focused on 
presidential authority.  In elaborating expectations for prosecutors, courts 
have never seriously considered that the president might seek to assert 
decision-making authority in federal criminal cases even occasionally, much 
less routinely.  Insofar as judges address charging decisions, trial decisions, 
and other prosecution decisions, their concern is not with who makes 
decisions, since it has always been assumed that prosecutors will make them, 
but with how decisions are made—with what considerations may and may 
not legitimately be considered.  Presidential control over prosecution would 
mean that federal courts, unlike state courts, cannot dictate that prosecutors, 
as lawyers responsible for criminal prosecutions, bring and try criminal cases 
consistently with the expectations that have built up over the course of two 
centuries around the idea of seeking justice. 
Federal courts are, for instance, reluctant to use their supervisory power 
over the grand jury process.  This is to protect the independence of that 
process, which is separate from the three branches of government.143  But 
courts do have an obligation to ensure the integrity of their proceedings.144  
In justifying their standoffishness, courts invoke the professional obligations 
of prosecutors.145  The integrity of the grand jury is policed, at the outskirts, 
by courts.  But it is ensured by a corps of professional prosecutors who pursue 
investigations and indictments for legitimate reasons, not partisan purposes 
or personal gain.146  If prosecutors are subject to presidential control and, as 
a general matter, are no longer making discretionary decisions according to 
professional norms, one of the premises for judicial restraint in exercise of 
its supervisory power will be lacking. 
Overlooking this implication of presidential control over prosecution risks 
altering the balance of powers significantly.  If courts cannot rely on 
prosecutors to make decisions in a disinterested manner, then they are 
compromised in their ability to interpret the law and apply it to the facts.  
Returning to our hypothetical, a court considering the case of the foreign 
national has no way of knowing that the charging decision departed from the 
well-worn tradition that prosecutors will not charge someone if they do not 
believe that person is guilty.147  The judge who presides over the case will 
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probably assume prosecutorial disinterestedness in making key rulings.  
While the defense will hopefully provide an important check, which could 
lead to the correct outcome, courts in the criminal justice system also rely on 
the prosecutor pursuing justice, not only criminal convictions, in reaching the 
right result.148 
In the context of a prosecution with partisan political implications, the 
concern is even greater.  In our hypothetical case with foreign policy 
implications, the president has interests that are different from and potentially 
in conflict with the principles that ought to inform decisions in criminal cases.  
Even more so in an investigation or prosecution of a federal executive 
official, as in Morrison, the president likely has an interest that directly 
conflicts with the principles governing disinterested prosecution.149  
Congress enacts laws that are meant to apply to everyone, including the 
cabinet and the president himself.150  The judiciary is supposed to apply those 
laws in particular circumstances.  The courts would be significantly 
compromised in this power if they were deprived of the ability to regulate 
federal prosecutors to ensure disinterested decision-making. 
One could argue that most presidents will likely do the right thing and do 
their part to ensure the integrity of the system, but prosecutorial decisions are 
made in private with no transparency—if a president chooses to exercise 
prosecutorial power, there is little way to ensure the propriety of his 
decisions.  Political scientists have argued that political actors in general and 
the president in particular are responsible for sustaining the legitimacy of the 
courts and judicial review.151  Keith Whittington, for instance, writes, “For 
the Court to compete successfully, other political actors must have reasons 
for allowing the Court to ‘win.’”152  Because presidents have the incentive to 
either undermine or buttress judicial supremacy (depending on the political 
climate of the day), it is more important for the public to know whether the 
president is making decisions in a criminal case and on what basis.  If a 
president were to decide to institute or halt a criminal case for illegitimate, 
self-interested reasons, such as protecting his political party’s power or his 
own well-being (thereby weakening the role of courts), this fact would 
remain opaque, inaccessible to Congress, the courts themselves, or the 
public.153  The president would thus weaken the judiciary without anyone 
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ever knowing.  In order for the political process to do its part in shaping the 
role of the judiciary, the relationship between the president and the courts 
must be transparent.  Whenever branches of government vie for power, which 
presidential control over prosecution clearly involves, the facts must be clear 
to all.  Without independent, disinterested prosecutors, we can never be sure 
that those facts are discovered, let alone made public. 
The executive branch’s interest in preserving its power in this area derives 
from its obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.154  The 
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has recognized that preserving the 
integrity of prosecutorial decision-making is fundamental to this Article II 
task.155  The president’s control over prosecutors, which is—as we explained 
above—itself fundamentally at odds with the integrity of prosecutorial 
decision-making, renders the justification for separation of powers moot.  
This sort of control is at odds with the rationale for the separation of powers 
since the executive is supposed to preserve the integrity of criminal law 
enforcement in general and prosecutorial decision-making in particular, not 
erode it. 
CONCLUSION:  DOES IT MATTER? 
Suppose we are right that ethics rules and norms, unless preempted by 
Article II of the Constitution, restrict the extent to which federal prosecutors 
may follow presidential directions in individual criminal cases.  What 
follows for federal prosecutors? 
As a preliminary matter, there is a question of how the president would 
communicate his command.  The DOJ has adhered to norms and regulations 
designed to protect prosecutorial independence from White House 
interference since Watergate.  Pursuant to this protocol, the president is 
allowed to communicate only through the Attorney General.156  It is unclear 
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whether these norms would be eliminated under the new regime.  Under a 
theory in which the president has complete control over prosecution, the 
president could simply order their retraction.  But the overhaul demonstrates 
what a radical departure this would be from policies and practices that have 
defined the DOJ for at least decades.  President Trump’s unprecedented use 
of Twitter to communicate demands and instructions raises the further 
question of whether or not individual prosecutors or the Attorney General 
would have to consider these more informal communications specific orders 
or at least factor them into any decision.157 
The prosecutor will have to decide whether to follow the president’s 
direction, which will be determined in part by whether the prosecutor 
concludes that the president generally has the claimed authority to control 
federal prosecutions.  If the OLC, which is responsible for advising the 
government on constitutional and other legal questions, concludes that the 
president generally possesses the claimed authority, some might expect 
federal prosecutors to go along.158  It would be unexpected for each to 
independently resolve the constitutional question.  While scholarly literature 
on the question may expand, prosecutors would not be expected to determine 
who has the better argument.  In general, subordinate lawyers may defer to 
supervising lawyers’ reasonable resolutions of arguable questions of 
professional duty.159  On the question of presidential power, subordinate 
prosecutors would likely just defer to the DOJ’s view.  Likewise, an Attorney 
General appointed by the president would be comfortable deferring to 
presidential decision-making if OLC says he may do so. 
Less clear will be how a prosecutor should respond when the president’s 
direction seems to be at odds with DOJ policy and practice, conventional 
prosecutorial norms, or the developed understandings about what it means to 
“seek justice.”  Perhaps OLC will take the position that, as a constitutional 
matter, presidential authority over criminal prosecutions supersedes 
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professional norms and ethics rules, so that prosecutors must follow 
presidential direction unless he directs them to act illegally (including 
unconstitutionally).  Or perhaps OLC will put forth a more nuanced view of 
the extent to which federal prosecutors must implement the president’s 
commands.160  In part, this scenario will test whether the DOJ’s conventional 
understandings, traditions, and practices regarding federal prosecutors’ role 
in seeking justice is more powerful for prosecutors than the tradition of 
deference to supervisory authority.161 
Suppose that the DOJ takes the view that prosecutors must defer to the 
president as to lawful acts.  While prosecutors may counsel against decisions 
with which they disagree, they would likely not find it difficult to carry those 
decisions out.  As a general matter, it is probably not unusual for federal 
prosecutors to disagree with the decisions of supervisory prosecutors and, as 
an ordinary matter, if the action dictated is not unlawful, subordinate 
prosecutors carry out the directions.  In rare cases, prosecutors might ask to 
be removed from a case, and in exceedingly rare cases, prosecutors might 
resign rather than implement a decision with which they strongly disagree or 
simply ignore instructions.162  But prosecutors understand that there is a 
prosecutorial hierarchy, that there is room for disagreement on questions of 
judgment and that there is, as a general matter, nothing wrong with carrying 
out decisions different from one’s own. 
If the DOJ takes the position that prosecutors must defer to the president, 
ethics questions will contribute modestly, at most, to a decision of the 
Attorney General or a subordinate prosecutor regarding whether to do so 
when a presidential direction sharply conflicts with DOJ policy or with the 
prosecutor’s view of what justice requires.  Even assuming that a professional 
conduct rule forecloses prosecutorial acquiescence, disciplinary authorities 
almost certainly would not proceed against prosecutors, given both the 
practical and constitutional uncertainty about the application of the rules.  As 
a general matter, disciplinary actions against prosecutors are rare.163  
Disciplinary actions against prosecutors are rarer still where, as here, the 
relevant standard of conduct is uncertain. 
Nor would a federal court be likely to employ the ethics rules as a predicate 
for dismissing an indictment or taking other action in a criminal case.  Federal 
courts are deferential to prosecutors, particularly on questions of 
prosecutorial discretion, and reluctant to use their supervisory authority to 
 
 160. The OLC does not have a history of impartial, nonpartisan decision-making. See. e.g., 
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:  Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1681, 1694–709 (2005) (criticizing the reasoning in the OLC “torture memos,” written 
by John Yoo and Jay Bybee, which supported the administration’s use of waterboarding and 
other extreme interrogation techniques). 
 161. For an extensive discussion of this type of dilemma for federal government employees 
in the contemporary context, see generally Keith A. Petty, Duty and Disobedience:  The 
Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 55 (2018). 
 162. See David Luban, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2010) 
(discussing an example of a New York City prosecutor). 
 163. Green, supra note 112, at 92; Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of 
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 743–62 (2001). 
1856 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
restrict prosecutors’ action.  Unless a court concluded that the prosecutor’s 
action was unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, it would be reluctant to 
intrude into the prosecutor’s decision or decision-making process.164 
In fact, there is little reason to think the court would ever know that the 
president was behind a particular charging decision or strategic choice.  If a 
prosecutor were to acquiesce to a president’s order either because the OLC 
had implemented a policy of deferring to presidential edict or because the 
prosecutor believed it was her individual obligation to do so, the court would 
never know that the prosecutor who was closest to the facts had determined 
independently that the prosecution was unjustified.  In our hypothetical 
scenario,165 the court would preside over a prosecution of the foreign official 
and, unaware of the administration’s motivations for the prosecution and 
doubts about the defendant’s guilt, the court would likely remand the 
defendant pending the trial and accede to the prosecution’s delaying tactics.  
In this scenario, the judiciary would be complicit by lending not only its 
authority but also its legitimacy to the defendant’s incarceration, until the 
government achieved its foreign policy objective or the case was otherwise 
resolved.  It would have assisted the executive in carrying out a foreign policy 
objective, but it would have done so by compromising the core function of 
courts to uncover the truth and apply the law to the facts in an evenhanded 
way.  The judiciary’s power to protect itself from the encroachment of the 
executive would be diminished, an outcome that does not comport with any 
theory about three coequal branches of government.166  
On the other hand, it is conceivable that an Attorney General or other 
federal prosecutor would opt instead to defy a presidential direction, as 
famously occurred in 1973 during Watergate when Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned 
rather than obey President Nixon’s order to fire independent special 
prosecutor Archibald Cox.167  If so, ethics rules may have some rhetorical 
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force in the prosecutor’s defense.  The prosecutor would not be limited to 
arguing that the president lacks the asserted constitutional authority.  The 
prosecutor could further argue in certain cases, such as the foreign policy 
scenario set out above, that she has ethical obligations, codified in the rules 
discussed above and furthering the standard set out in Berger to “seek 
justice,” which conflict with her carrying out the president’s instruction. 
If this happened on a broad scale—a thought experiment to be sure—and 
prosecutors throughout the DOJ recused themselves from a particular case, 
perhaps the president’s goal of controlling the outcome of that case would be 
thwarted.  If, in an even more unlikely scenario, the president sought to exert 
his control over all cases, intervening here and there not for criminal justice 
purposes but rather to further assert his will and political power, it is at least 
possible that all or most federal prosecutors could resign rather than shirk 
their ethical obligations.  Federal prosecution might become such an 
unpalatable job for well-trained lawyers devoted to the quality and ethical 
caliber of their work that it would be hard or even impossible to attract well-
qualified lawyers to this job.  If so, ironically, the president might be thwarted 
in his ability to execute the laws. 
If the propriety of presidential control of criminal prosecutions is not a 
question for courts to resolve through their application of professional 
conduct rules or their interpretation of the Constitution, but is principally a 
question for presidents to resolve as a matter of self-restraint, for Congress, 
and for the voting public, then the resolution may not be clear.  Constitutional 
arguments for presidential power over prosecutions predicated on the idea of 
a “unitary executive” have simplicity and intuitive appeal.  But so do 
countervailing arguments that a president cannot ask a prosecutor to violate 
her ethical and professional obligations.  This argument should resonate with 
professionals and others who believe in the primacy of professional 
obligation.  The countervailing claim that presidential power somehow 
preempts professional obligation is not, at a level of generality, very 
appealing.  Further, the more nuanced constitutional argument, that 
presidential power trumps only certain professional regulations including 
those here, may be hard to understand.  But even if it is a matter to be decided 
by the political will of the people, presidential control of prosecutors’ 
decisions may not be transparent.  The public might assume that presidents 
are abiding by the long tradition of independence and protecting the 
independent judiciary when in fact the opposite is true.  It is hard for the 
public to assert its political will if it does not know how decisions are being 
made. 
Even if the public could police the president, presidential power over 
federal prosecutions threatens an independent judiciary.  In order to pursue 
the public interest by applying the law to facts in individual cases, the 
judiciary is dependent on disinterested prosecutors.  Many rules governing 
prosecutors’ conduct are designed to ensure that prosecutors serve justice 
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rather than individual interests or some other illegitimate end.  Presidential 
control over prosecutions threatens this equilibrium.  It directly interferes 
with the courts’ ability both to regulate prosecutors according to ethics rules 
and judicial standards and to rely on the professional norms of prosecutors to 
ensure that prosecutors are policing themselves. 
We previously argued that the president has no statutory or constitutional 
authority to control prosecutorial decision-making.168  Here, we play out the 
consequences of the competing view, expressed by President Trump’s 
lawyers, Justice Scalia in his dissent in Morrison, and various scholars, that 
the president has absolute control over the DOJ.  We have shown that 
exercising such control would lead to the abdication of established 
prosecutorial norms and ethical requirements, which, in turn, would 
undermine the proper functioning of the judiciary.  This ensuing chaos offers 
additional support for our argument that while the president should set broad 
policy objectives and communicate those priorities to the Attorney General, 
the president cannot exercise control over prosecutors’ decisions in 
individual cases, even when those cases have foreign policy implications. 
Any argument to preserve prosecutorial independence from presidential 
incursion must be mindful of the dangers involved.  Independent prosecutors 
are far from perfect.  They sometimes abuse their discretion and violate their 
obligations to the public.  The challenge is to check abuses by leaving 
different parties in charge of those decisions that they are best suited to make.  
Discretionary decisions in criminal prosecutions are best left to trained and 
experienced professionals, who are policed by the profession and the 
courts.169  The president’s political and personal interests, as well as his 
distance from the facts and the traditions of prosecution, are at odds with this 
goal.  The president retains control over the execution of criminal laws 
through the constitutional power to hire and fire the Attorney General.170  
This balance ensures that the president maintains the power to “take Care” 
that the laws are faithfully executed without threatening longstanding 
prosecutorial norms that help preserve the integrity of the judicial process. 
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